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1  The Cartesian Skeptical Argument 
Let us start by considering an updated version of the skeptical concerns that 
Descartes raised in the first Meditation.
1 Imagine a living brain floating in a vat of 
nutrient fluids while attached to a supercomputer. The computer is programmed 
to provide electrical stimuli to the brain that are just like those a normal brain 
receives due to input to the sense-organs connected to the normal brain. As a 
result, the brain in a vat is caused to have experiences just like those of a normal 
human. The brain in a vat, we are to imagine, is the subject of conscious mental 
life just like that of a normal human: experience, thought, belief, desire, intention, 
and so on. Upon having various experiences, the brain in a vat thinks, ‘The waves 
are breaking nicely here on Sands Beach in Santa Barbara’. Imagine that the brain 
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in a vat is a mental twin of you: whenever you have an experience of seeing sand 
and surf, the brain in a vat has an exactly similar experience. When you think, 
‘The sand is hot, and the surf is big’, the brain thinks, ‘The sand is hot, and the 
surf is big’. According to the Cartesian philosopher, the brain in a vat is massively 
mistaken about his world. He believes that he is sitting on a beach, for example, 
even though he is not, and cannot, sit anywhere. 
You might ask: in the imagined vat scenario, what is the explanation for the 
envatted brain’s predicament? On one version of the thought experiment, we are 
to imagine a normal human who is kidnapped by evil neuroscientists who relieve 
him of his brain in order to test the deceptive powers of their supercomputer’s 
brain-manipulating program. On a different version of the thought experiment (due 
to Hilary Putnam), we are to imagine that the brain has always been envatted; 
there are no evil neuroscientists; there are no trees or beaches in the vat world; 
there is nothing but the brain in its vat in a room with the supercomputer; and 
this arrangement has come about as a result of some cosmic accident. We will call 
this special Putnamian brain in a vat a BIV.
2 Let SK be the proposition that I am a 
BIV. 
Now let us depart the arid vat world just considered and dally in an English 
garden. I say to my friend, ‘That is a goldfinch in the tree’. My friend asks, ‘Old 
boy, do you know that it is a goldfinch?’ I reply, ‘Yes, I know that it is a goldfinch 
because it has those markings’. He retorts, ‘Do you realize that goldcrests also 
have those markings? How do you know, then, that it is not a goldcrest? How can 
you rule out that possibility on the basis of your evidence?’. I then admit, ‘I do not 
know that it is not a goldcrest–-I cannot rule out the goldcrest possibility. But I 
know that it is a goldfinch’. At this point, my friend throws up his hands and says, 
‘Look, old chum, if you do know that it is a goldfinch, and you realize that if it is a 
goldfinch, then it cannot be a goldcrest, then you must also know that it is not a 
goldcrest. Since you have admitted that your evidence does not enable you to 
know that it is not a goldcrest, you surely must in all fairness retract your claim to 
know that it is a goldfinch’.
3 
In this exchange, my friend’s exasperation at my pigheadedness stems from 
his acceptance of the principle that knowledge is closed under known logical 
implication. Letting ‘K(S,P)’ stand for ‘S knows that P’, and letting 
‘→‘ stand for logical implication, we can formulate our Closure Principle as 
follows: 
For all S,P,Q: {K(S,P) & K(S,[P → Q])} → K(S,Q) 
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Let us now return to the proposition SK = I am a BIV. Suppose SK were true. 
By construction of the BIV scenario, my experiences would be no different in an 
SK world than they would be in a normal world. So the experiences I in fact have 
do not discriminate between an SK world, in which I am a BIV, and a normal 
world, in which I am embodied and have experiences caused by beaches, surf, 
and sand. These considerations lead the Cartesian skeptic to maintain that my 
sensory evidence does not justify me in believing ~SK = I am not a BIV. Since 
knowledge requires justification, it follows that I do not know ~SK. 
We can now construct a Cartesian skeptical argument to show that I do not 
know, say, H = I have hands. Let ‘AB’ denote me. 
(1) {K(AB,H) & K(AB,[H → ~SK])} → K(~SK) 
(2) K(AB,[H → ~SK]) 
(3)  ~K(AB, ~SK) 
So,    (4)  ~K(AB,H) 
Premise (1) is an instance of the Closure Principle. (2) simply expresses that fact 
that I know the logical implication in question. (3) is based upon the skeptic’s 
claims about the indiscriminability of SK worlds and normal worlds. (4) follows 
from (1)-(3) by Modus Tollens and DeMorgan’s Laws. The skeptic seems to have 
proved that I do not know that I have hands! He will invite me to run through a 
parallel argument for my claim to know that I see surf and sand. And so on. 
2  Semantic Externalism and Content Externalism 
Let us now consider a response to the skeptical argument that employs some 
ideas that derive from the work of Hilary Putnam.
4 Imagine that a Martian looks at 
a paint blob that causes him to form a mental image that exactly resembles my 
mental image of a palm tree. Imagine that the Martian has had no causal contact 
with trees and no causal contact with anyone who has had causal contact with 
trees. My image is an image of a palm tree; it represents and refers to palm trees. 
But even though the Martian’s image exactly resembles mine, his image does not 
have the foregoing semantic features of aboutness, representation, and reference. 
Putnam’s intuition is that there is a causal constraint on such semantic features 
that is not satisfied by the Martian’s image. 
We are assuming that the BIV has a language that he uses in thinking, 
believing, wondering, and so on. The BIV never speaks or writes, of course, but he 
has a rich mental life that involves use of his language. The BIV’s language is 
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superficially just like English (recall that we imagined him to be my mental twin, 
though, as we will shortly see, this cannot be quite right). For example, whenever I 
think a thought using the sentence ‘That is a palm tree’, my BIV twin thinks a 
thought using that sentence. But what do the BIV’s words ‘palm tree’ refer to? 
Given the foregoing considerations concerning the Martian’s image, Putnam 
maintains that the BIV’s  ‘palm tree’ does not refer to palm trees, just as the 
Martian’s image does not refer to or represent palm trees. This is because the causal 
constraint on reference is not satisfied vis-a-vis the BIV’s words ‘palm tree’ and 
palm trees. That is, there are no palm trees in the vat world to serve as referents for 
his words ‘palm tree’; the BIV never has any causal contact – direct or indirect – 
with palm trees, and thus his words do not refer to palm trees. What do those words 
refer to, then? One answer that is suggested by Putnam is as follows. Find the 
entities in the vat-world that play a causal role vis-a-vis the BIV’s uses of ‘palm tree’ 
that is analogous to the causal role that palm trees play vis-a-vis a normal English 
speaker’s uses of ‘palm tree’. The best candidates for such entities are the recurring 
computer program features which cause electrical stimuli in the brain, which stimuli 
in turn produce experiences just like those which are produced in normal humans as 
a result of seeing palm trees. Call these PT program features. 
So on this view, the BIV’s words ‘palm tree’ differ in their reference from a 
normal human’s words ‘palm tree’. So there must also be a difference in meaning 
between the BIV’s words and a normal human’s words, given that the meaning of a 
term determines its reference. These semantic differences will also induce a 
difference between the truth conditions of a BIV’s sentence ‘A palm tree is near’ and 
those of a normal human’s corresponding sentence. The normal human’s sentence 
‘A palm tree is near’ is true if and only if a palm tree is near to the human, whereas 
the BIV’s sentence ‘A palm tree is near’ is true if and only if PT program features are 
running. The semantic differences between the BIV’s language and that of a normal 
human are ultimately induced by the differences between the two creatures’ 
external, causal environments. Let us call this Putnamian view semantic externalism. 
Semantic externalism engenders some interesting results concerning the mental 
states of the BIV. Since the BIV’s words ‘palm tree’ do not refer to palm trees and 
differ in meaning from a normal human’s corresponding words, and since his 
sentence ‘A palm tree is near’ does not have the same truth conditions as a normal 
human’s corresponding sentence, we cannot say that when the BIV thinks a 
thought using that sentence, he is thinking a thought with the same content as a 
normal human’s thought that a palm tree is near. The semantic differences we have 
noted induce differences in the contents of the mental states had by the BIV and a 
normal human. The BIV cannot think that a palm tree is near, nor can he think that 
there are big waves at Sands Beach. The BIV’s corresponding thoughts are about 
the entities in his external, causal environment which systematically produce his 
experiences, viz. recurring computer program features such as the PT program 
features. So the contents of the BIV’s thoughts, beliefs, desires, and wonderings 
depend upon his external, causal environment. Let us call this view content 
externalism.   57
Now we see that the BIV cannot be the mental twin of a normal human. If 
God were to somehow “look inside” the minds of the BIV and his normal human 
counterpart, then He could not distinguish the two creatures’ mental states purely 
on the basis of their inner phenomenology. But the states would nevertheless 
differ in content in virtue of the differences between the creatures’ external, causal 
environments. Now we also see that one of our key initial Cartesian claims about 
the BIV thought experiment was not correct. That is, we characterized the BIV as 
being massively mistaken about his world. But that claim presupposed that when 
the BIV has a belief that he expresses using his sentence ‘A palm tree is near’, the 
content of the belief in question is that a palm tree is near. If the BIV had that 
belief, then he would be mistaken, since no palm tree is near to him. But 
according to semantic externalism, the BIV has no such belief. Instead, he has a 
belief about computer program features – a belief which is not mistaken, given 
that the appropriate program features are running. According to the content 
externalist, the Cartesian philosopher is mistaken in the following assumption: in 
the BIV thought experiment, we can hold fixed the mental life of a normal human 
while varying, in thought, his external environment (normal world to vat world), 
with the result that the BIV’s beliefs are those of a normal human and hence 
massively mistaken. 
3  The Self-Knowledge Quiz and the Transcendental Argument 
Let us pause for a bit and cleanse our minds of all concerns regarding Cartesian 
skepticism, semantic externalism, and content externalism. Let us imagine that I am 
looking out my window with a puzzled expression. My friend asks me, ‘What are 
you thinking?’ I say, ‘Oh, I’m thinking that some palm trees have palm rats. I had 
forgotten, but now I see a rat in that palm tree’. My friend says, ‘But do you know 
that you are thinking that some palm trees have palm rats? Maybe you are thinking 
that quantum entanglement is amusing’. I reply, ‘Are you crazy? Of course I know 
that I am thinking that some palm trees have palm rats. Maybe that thing is not a 
palm rat, and maybe there are no such things as palm rats. Who knows – maybe 
there are no such things as palm trees at all. Maybe some elaborate trick has been 
played on me all these years. But at least I know what I am thinking right now, and 
it’s this: that some palm trees have palm rats’. 
In this dialogue, I am expressing the natural view that I have easy, direct, 
unproblematic access to my own current mental states. Unlike my knowledge of 
others’ mental states, my knowledge of my own mental states is almost never 
evidentially based. Further, in the vast majority of cases, when I believe that I am in 
a certain mental state, my belief is correct. Such accuracy is obviously lacking in my 
beliefs about the mental states of others. 
Let us now return to the Cartesian skeptical argument formulated earlier. Its 
third premise is 
(3)  ~K(AB, ~SK)   58
viz. I do not know that I am not a BIV. We will now construct an argument for the 
conclusion that ~SK – that I am not a BIV. If the argument is successful, then I 
can claim to know ~SK on the basis of knowing the premises of the argument and 
knowing that they logically imply the conclusion, ~SK. By this method, we will 
block the Cartesian skeptical argument by showing that its premise (3) is false. In 
order for this strategy to work, we must make a case for the claim that my knowl-
edge of the constructed anti-skeptical argument’s premises does not somehow 
rest upon or presuppose knowledge of propositions about the external world. As 
we will see, it is a rather delicate matter to decide whether our constructed argu-
ment satisfies this criterion of adequacy. We are trying to construct a sort of tran-
scendental argument for ~SK: an argument whose premises are (i) thin enough to 
be allowed in play by the skeptic(since they do not somehow presuppose knowl-
edge about the external world), but, at the same time, (ii) strong enough to estab-
lish the conclusion ~SK. 
The first premise of our transcendental argument is justified by considerations 
that flow from content externalism. In general, if something is a BIV, then it 
cannot think that a palm tree is near. As we saw earlier, no BIV thinks such a 
thought when it thinks a thought using the sentence ‘A palm tree is near’. I know 
this general proposition about BIVs on the basis of knowing the truth of content 
externalism, and I know the truth of that doctrine via philosophical reflection. This 
puts me in a position to know that, in particular, if I am a BIV, then I am not 
thinking that a palm tree is near. 
Given my easy, direct, unproblematic knowledge of my own mind and its 
current mental states, I am now in a position to answer the following Self-
Knowledge Quiz: 
Q: What are you thinking ? 
A: (a) That quantum entanglement is amusing. 
  (b) That cows are purple. 
  (c) That North America is south of South America. 
  (d) That a palm tree is near. 
The answer is (d), and I know that the answer is (d). This is a quiz that is very 
hard for me to fail. 
Given these reflections, I can now construct the desired transcendental 
argument: 
(A)  If I am a BIV, then I am not thinking that a palm tree is near. (by 
Content Externalism) 
(B)  I am thinking that a palm tree is near. (by Self – Knowledge Quiz) 
So  (C)  I am not a BIV. 
In symbols, (C) is ~SK. Given my knowledge of the premises (A) and (B), and 
given my knowledge of the validity of the argument, I know the conclusion. So we 
have K(AB,~SK). So the skeptical argument is stymied, since its premise (3) – 
~K(AB,~SK) – is false.   59
One way for the skeptic to respond to the argument is to reject content 
externalism. I will not pursue this line of response, for two reasons. First, content 
externalism is extremely plausible and is widely accepted: if a BIV has any 
thoughts at all, then they do not have contents that concern absent trees and 
beaches. Second, I want to see whether content externalism can indeed ground a 
successful transcendental argument for ~SK. So I would like to envision a situation 
in which the Cartesian skeptic simply grants the very plausible content externalist 
doctrine for the sake of argument and then see whether the transcendental 
argument is indeed successful. 
4  Question-Begging and Epistemic Circularity 
Given this dialectical situation, it is tempting to regard the transcendental 
argument as somehow question-begging. Charges of question-begging in 
philosophy are often very hard to adjudicate. The present case, as we will see, is a 
case in point. The argument is obviously not formally circular, in that the conclusion 
does not appear as a premise. Nevertheless, here is one way that the skeptic might 
try to substantiate the charge of question-begging. The skeptic: ‘I am granting the 
content externalist premise (A) for the sake of argument. I want to see just how far 
you, the anti-skeptic, can go when fueled by the doctrine of content externalism. 
However, I am now suspicious about premise (B). We are obviously in dispute about 
the conclusion (C): you say you know it, I say you don’t – -you say that you know 
that you are not a BIV, I say that you don’t know this. But given that I have granted 
you (A), it turns out that whether or not you are now thinking that a palm tree is 
near depends upon whether or not you are a BIV. But whether or not you are a BIV 
is in dispute. So I will not accept your premise (B), according to which you are now 
thinking that a palm tree is near.’ 
This is a bad objection. The same “question-begging” objection can be made to 
any modus tollens argument where two disputants disagree about the conclusion 
while accepting the conditional premise. The disputant who wants to reject the 
second premise must consider what sort of case can be be made for the premise 
while prescinding from the fact that given the conditional premise, the second 
premise will yield the disputed conclusion. 
At this point it might be useful to discuss the notion of epistemic circularity. Let 
us say that an argument is epistemically circular just in case having justification for 
accepting one or more premises depends upon having justification for accepting the 
conclusion. Consider this track record argument: 
Perceptual belief B1 was true. 
Perceptual belief B2 was true. 
• 
• 
• 
Perceptual belief Bn was true. 
So,  Perception is a reliable belief-forming process (in virtue of its track record).   60
In order to have justification for accepting any given premise of this argument, one 
needs to have justification for accepting the conclusion about the reliability of 
perception. Otherwise, how could one have justification for believing that, say, 
perceptual belief B1 was true? Such an epistemically circular argument suffers 
from the following deficiency: if I start the day lacking justification for believing 
the track record argument’s conclusion, then the argument lacks the power to 
engender such justification by consideration of its premises. 
It might be thought that our transcendental argument is epistemically 
circular. We are supposing that the skeptic grants for the sake of argument that 
I know premise (A): so I know that if I am a BIV, then I am not thinking that a 
palm tree is near. Am I justified in accepting premise (B): am I justified in 
believing that I am thinking that a palm tree is near? It might seem that in order 
to have the justification in question, I must have justification for believing that I 
am not a BIV. For if I am a BIV, then I am not thinking the thought in question, 
and premise (B) is false. 
However, this is simply a variation on the theme of the foregoing bad 
question-begging charge. The structure of the current objection is as follows. 
‘Consider the argument: If P, then Q; ~Q; so ~P. Suppose that I know the first 
premise: if P, then Q. Am I justified in accepting the second premise, ~Q? In 
order to have justification for believing ~Q, I must have justification for believing 
the conclusion, ~P. For if I had justification for P instead (in addition to having 
justification for the conditional, as we have assumed), then I’d have justification 
for believing that Q, rather than ~Q, is also the case. So the argument is 
epistemically circular, just like the track record argument’. But, again, this 
objection can be made against any Modus Tollens argument whose conditional 
premise is not in dispute. Surely not all such arguments are epistemically 
circular.
5 
It could be that the following reflections are driving the current charge of 
epistemic circularity. Suppose that we accept a closure principle for justification 
that is modeled on the closure principle for knowledge. Let ‘J(S,P)’ stand for ‘S 
has justification for believing P’: 
For all S,P,Q: {J(S,P) & J(S,[P → Q])}→ J(S,Q) 
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If I have justification for the conditional premise in the foregoing Modus Tollens ar-
gument (which I do, since, we assume, I know the premise), and I have justification 
for believing the second premise, ~Q, then by Closure it follows that I have justifica-
tion for believing the conclusion, ~P. But given Closure, this result holds for all modus 
tollens arguments. Again, surely not all such arguments are epistemically circular. 
Let us consider another way of trying to make a circularity, or question-
begging, charge stick. Let us consider an adapted version of some reasoning given 
by Duncan Pritchard and Jesper Kallestrup in a recent paper.
6 As we have noted 
earlier, our criterion of adequacy requires that the premises of our transcendental 
argument must be knowable without reliance upon empirical knowledge about the 
external world. Otherwise, the premises will not be thin enough to be granted by 
the Cartesian skeptic. One way of putting this criterion of adequacy (using the 
terminology of Pritchard and Kallestrup) is this: the truth of premises of the 
transcendental argument must be reflectively determinable, in the sense that they 
must be knowable without reliance upon empirical knowledge. Is the truth of 
premise (B) reflectively determinable? That is, can I reflectively determine that I am 
thinking that a palm tree is near? Pritchard and Kallestrup argue in the negative as 
follows. If I am thinking that a palm tree is near, then I am not a BIV. So if I can 
reflectively determine that I am thinking that a palm tree is near, then I must be in a 
position to reflectively determine that I am not a BIV. But since my experiences do 
not discriminate between being a non-BIV and being a BIV, I cannot reflectively 
determine that I am not a BIV. Hence, I cannot reflectively determine that I am 
thinking that a palm tree is near. 
This reasoning is flawed in several ways. It seems to presuppose that 
reflectively determining the truth of our argument’s conclusion is somehow a 
precondition for reflectively determining the truth of premise (B) (since given (A), the 
conclusion follows). But the situation is o t h e r w i s e .  I  w i l l  c o m e  t o  k n o w  t h e  
conclusion–-that I am not a BIV–-as a result of reflectively determining the truth of 
the premises and then deriving the conclusion. Can I reflectively determine the truth 
of premise (B)? It seems that I can. Otherwise the Self-Knowledge Quiz would be a 
lot harder than it is. 
Let us take up another question raised by the Pritchard-Kallestrup reasoning. 
Can I reflectively determine that I am not a BIV? As they point out, my 
experiences do not discriminate normal worlds from vat worlds. So I cannot 
reflectively determine that I am not a BIV on the basis of my experiences. This is 
the idea behind premise (3) of the Cartesian skeptical argument: ~K(AB,~SK). So 
my experiences do not enable me to reflectively determine that I am not a BIV. 
But this is all right if, as I have claimed, the truth of our transcendental argument’s 
premise can be reflectively determined. Once that is achieved, I can reflectively 
determine that I am not a BIV by deducing this conclusion from the reflectively 
determined premises. 
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5  Indiscriminability 
Suppose the skeptic gives up on the evanescent charge of question-begging 
and instead focuses more intensely upon the indiscriminability of vat worlds and 
normal worlds. My experiences do not enable me to discriminate between the 
external reality of a vat world and the external reality of a normal world. Similarly, 
the skeptic may suggest, nothing reflectively available to me enables me to 
discriminate between the divergent mental aspects of vat worlds and normal 
worlds. That is, by content externalism, my thought contents are different in vat 
worlds and normal worlds: in vat worlds, I cannot think that a palm tree is near, 
while in normal worlds, I can think that thought. Nothing reflectively available to 
me enables me to discriminate between vat-content-worlds and normal-content-
worlds. So I am not justified in believing that I am in a normal-content-world 
where I think that a palm tree is near. So I do not know that I am thinking that a 
palm tree is near. 
The question of whether content externalism is compatible with easy, direct, 
unproblematic knowledge of one’s own mental states is notoriously difficult.
7 Here 
I can only explore the tip of the iceberg. I will focus upon the notion of 
indiscriminability. It is natural to analyze indiscriminability as follows: situations X 
and Y are indiscriminable to me just in case it is possible for me to be in X and yet 
mistakenly think that I am in Y. Is it true that vat-content-worlds and normal-
content-worlds are indiscriminable to me? Imagine that I am in a vat world and 
think a thought using the sentence 
(T) I am thinking that a palm tree is near. 
In such a world, am I mistakenly thinking that my thought-content is other than it 
in fact is, thereby failing to discriminate my vat-content-world from a normal-
content-world? No: in such a world, my thought-content is that PT features are 
running, and in thinking a thought using (T), I correctly self-attribute that thought-
content. So the skeptic’s claim of indiscriminability is unfounded, and my claim to 
know premise (B) of our transcendental argument stands. 
6  Conclusion 
If content externalism and self-knowledge are compatible, then our 
transcendental argument gives us a plausible response to the BIV-based Cartesian 
skeptical argument. That is a big ‘if’, but effectively resolving the question of 
compatibility is too difficult a task for the present occasion. We will close on a 
pessimistic note. It has often been noted that there are restricted brain in a vat 
scenarios that are immune to our transcendental argument. Consider Sam, a 
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normal human, who is captured by the evil neuroscientists discussed in passing at 
beginning of this paper. Sam’s brain is envatted, and his new stream of 
experiences fits seamlessly with his previous normal life. The semantics of Sam’s 
language remains the same after the envatment. His words ‘palm tree’ continue to 
refer to palm trees, and he retains the capacity to think that a palm tree is near. 
Maybe  I am just like Sam, freshly envatted! If so, then our transcendental 
argument is of no use to me.
8 That argument can, surprisingly, deliver the result 
that I am not a Putnamian BIV who has always been in a vat in a treeless and 
beachless vat world. But the argument cannot deliver the result that I am not a 
brand new brain in a vat in an otherwise normal world. 
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